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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

CLARENCE P. MARTIN,
Plaintiff and Ap·pellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 77 6'6

RALPH L. JONES, dba MOUNT
AIR PHARMACY,
Defendant and Respondent.

REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF· IN ANSWER
TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

ARGUMENT
. CASES CITED IN SUPPORT OF THE COURT'S DECISION DISTINGUISHED.

In his answer to respondent's petition for a rehearing, appellant has cited a number of decisions, which it is
claimed support the majority opinion in this case. Those
1
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dPeisions involve different facts than the situation out of
which this case arose; for example, in some of the cases
cited, the injured person was a child a~d therefore not
'
<~apable of exercising the same degree of' care to avoid
injury to himself as an adult, or to even realize he was
a trespasser. Of course, under those circumstances the
owner has a duty to warn the child of a dangerous condition on the premises upon becoming aware of his presence thereon or having sufficient reason to expect the
child to be upon the premises in close proximity to said
danger. This, in Blaycock v. Goates, et al, 44 Cal. App. 2d
850, 113 P2 256, cited on Page 4 of appellant's brief, the
suit involved injuries to a 13-year old girl. In McPheters
v. Loo1nis, 125 Conn. 526, 7 Atl. 2 437, cited on Page 7
of ap·pellant's br~ef, the suit was for damages resulting
from the death of a 9-year old boy.
Where the person injured is an adult, whom the
owner could reasonably assume knew he is a trespasser
and consequently under a duty to be more alert for danger of injury to himself from conditions or activities
on the premises, the duty of the owner to warn the trespasser is much less or, dep~nding upon the circumstances,
may not exist.
In the case of Euclid 105th Street's Property Cornpany v. Backman, 42 NE 2nd 789, cited on Page 5 of appellant's brief, the injured party was a tenant who fell
through a sky light which had been covered with tar paper
to resemble the rest of the roof. The employees of the
apartment house had frequently seen the plaintiff and
2
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others \vashing \vind0\\'8 fron1 th~ roof where the tt~tutnt
was standing 'vhen she fell. Under such cireuHl~buH·ps
it could logically be n1aintained that the plaintiff had an
irnplied invitation to be "~here she \vas, certainly not the
situation at the :Jiount . .:\..ir Pharmacy \vhen this aeeident
occurred.
There is no evidence that the defendant owner or his
employees had reason to anticipate that plaintiff would
go be}~ond the colmter in proximity to the shaft opening.
True: ~Irs. Cannon, an employee, saw him there. She
did not warn him of the nearness of the opening. The
light was more than sufficient for him to see the shaft.
To get to the place where he reached for the pencils, it
was necessary for him to walk directly towards its location, which was at the extreme west end of the area behind the counter, and to get behind the counter, it was
necessary for him to walk past the sign reading "No J\dInission-Employees Only". Under such circumstances,
we submit that Mrs. Cannon was under no duty as a matter
of law to warn the plaintiff of the condition which was as
apparent to him as to her and, further, she was entitled
to assume that the plaintiff had not only observed the
opening but had also seen the sign which in itself constituted a warning of the probability of the existence
of a dangerous condition in the restricted area. This
principle is set out in Paragraph 2 under Section 336 of
the Restatement of the Law of Torts, as follows:
"2. The trespasser having no privilege to
enter the premises must realize that he should be
on the alert to observe not only the condition of
3
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the land but alRo the possessor's activities thereon.
The possessor is therefore often entitled to assume
that a trespasser will realize his danger under
conditions in which no such assumption would he
permissible if a similar situation occurred in a
public place or if the trespasser were a licensee."
We have no quarrel with the Rule of law that requires an
owner to warn a trespasser of a dangerous condition
when the owner under the circumstances should reasonrably know that the trespasser is unaware of the said dangerous condition and is thereby likely to be injured. In
some situations, the circumstances may he such as to be
tantamount to actual knowledge on the part of the owner.
The decision of this court adopting Section 337 of the Restatement of Torts extends the doctrine to the extent that
the owner or possessor of premises becomes in effect an
insurer of the safety of all persons coming upon his land,
including trespassers, even though such persons are injured by an artificial condition which the owner is lawfully maintaining. The decision in this case obviates
entirely the distinction between the duty an owner has
towards an invitee upon the premises and the duty that
an ower has towards a trespasser. There would be very
few instances where a jury could not find that the owner
"ought to have known that such a trespasser is near the
danger", or "had reason to believe the trespasser would
not discover the danger", particularly if the injury were
sufficiently serious to invoke sympathy. Heretofore,
this court has always refused to apply such a rule.
In the case of Bogden v. L. A. & 8. L .R.. R.

C~m-
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pa.n.y, 59 Utah 505, :205 P. 571, a boy went upon a railroad
right of 'va.y looking for sheep and while there collected
powder from the floor of a railroad car, which he exploded causing severe burns to himself. Justice Frick of
this Court held there was no liability on the part of the
defendant and said:
·'vVhile the accident was an unfortunate one,
yet it \vas one which the defendant could not have
foreseen, and therefore cannot legally be held liable for. In the conduct of rnodern business enterprises, accidents will, and of necessity must, happen. The la,Y, .ho,vever, does not impose liability
·lmless the party charged with negligence could by
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence have
prevented the accident. Although children of ten. der years are favored by the law, yet, even before
one of thern can recover for an injury, it must
appear that the p·erson causing the injury owed a
duty to the injured child, and that he negligently
failed to discharge that duty by failing to exercise that degree of care that the law imposed under the circumstances. It goes without saying
that one cannot discharge a duty before it is
lmo,vn to exist, and while actual knowledge of its
existence is not always necessary, yet the facts
must be such that knowledge may be imputed upon
the ground that the person charged by the exercise of reasonable care ought to have known, and
hence, in contemplation of law, did know."
And in the case of Smalley v. Rio Gr(JJYI)de Western
Ry. Co., 34 U. 4:23, 98 P. 311, where a minor child came
upon the defendant's railroad yard and was injured
while climbing on one of the cars which was being moved
hy the defendant, the Court said:

5
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"That is, before negligence can he predicated
on a failure to observe a reasonable lookout or in
the manner in which the cars were operated or
managed about the yard, it must be held that a
duty to use care in such particular was owing
from the defendant to the plaintiff. F·or every case
of actionable negligence involves a duty to use
care and a breach of such duty resulting in injury.·
Whether in a given case a duty to use care was
imposed on a party charged with negligence is
ordinarily a question of law. A railroad company,
as a matter of law, owes a duty to those who are
rightfully about its premises, or who are there
with its express or implied permission or invitation, to use care. It ordinarily owes no such duty
to one who is wrongfully about its premises. The
employees of the defendant' were under no duty to
use care in the handling of the cars about the
yard in anticipation of wholly unauthorized intrusions of others. As to such persons, no duty
to use care arose, until their presence was discovered.... Where the public or the people of a
neighborhood, though technically unauthorized,
have for a considerable length of time generally
or habitua1ly traversed railroad premises without
objection, there is much reason for holding that
the employees of the railroad company are required to take notice of such facts and to regulate
their conduct accordingly. But the evidence does
not show that kind of a case or any case where
the unauthorized or uninvited presence of any one
1vas acquiesced in or permitted without objection."
The general rule is as stated in Brown v. Salt Lake

City, 33 Utah 222; 93 P. 570, on Page 238, wherein the
court said:
6
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HAs against In ere· intruders or licensees, the
owner need not maintain his pre1nises in a reasonably safe condition but as to those who come upon
then1 by invitation, express or ilnplied, he o'\ves the
duty of reasonable care for their safety; that is
the general rule and to depart from it in favor of
adult persons would cast a burden upon the ownership in do1ninion of private property, which would
be intolerable."
The opinion then distinguishes a situation where.a
child of tender years is on the premises because of an
attractive nuisance. The rule announced by the cases
setting out the duty of an owner towards a trespasser
is overruled by the decision in this case as effectively as
if the opinion had specifically held that a landowner
owes the same duty to a trespasser as to an invitee; that
is, to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition
for anyone who enters, whether privileged to do so or
not. See also Bird v. Cloverleaf Harris Dairy, 102 1Jtah
330, 125 P. 2d 797, wherein Justice Wolfe says:
"The owner was under no duty to keep his
property safe for trespassers or rnere licensees."
C'ONTRIBUTORY NE·GLIGE.NCE
In his opinion Chief Justice Wolfe attempts to distinguish between the facts of the case and the facts in
the case of Knox v. Snow (Utah), 229 P2 874. In this situation - true - there were no obstacles in plaintiff's
path as he approached the opening comparable to those
in the service station premises in Knox v. Snow; however, the narrowness of the aisle behind the counter re-
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quired the plaintiff to walk directly toward the opening
to get to a place where he could reach the pencils and of
necessity would compel him to observe the floor area
where the opening was located. Also, there was a raised
border around the hole four inches wide and one inch
high. 'The evidence was undisputed the the floor was well
lighted. We agree that in the majority of cases where a
person is injured by stepping or falling into a hole or defect in the floor, that the question of contributory negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout is an issue for
the jury. However, the court has overlooked the distinction that the plaintiff in this case was a mature man, 46
years of age and indisputably a trespasser. He had a
greater duty to be more alert for his safety and to see
this hole than would an invitee or a child. There was no
reason for him to assume that the proprietor would use
reasonable care to keep the area behind the counter safe
for his use. His testimony is quoted ver ba.tim, (Record
63):

"Q. You had been in the Mount Air Pharmacy a
a number of times before November 11ththe day of this accident~
A.

A number of times, yes.

Q.

And on any of those prior occasions, had you
ever been behind the liquor counter~

A.

Never been behind it, no.

Q.

Had you ever seen any other patrons behind
that counter or any one other than the persons who were working there~

A.

I don't remember seeing anyone.
8
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Q.

There 'Yere other places in the store where
patrons did nor ordinarily go, were there
not!

~\..

Yes.

Q.

You had never been behind the column to the
east of the liquor counter J?

A.

No."

In the course of the argument before this court on
rehearing, Justice Wolfe commented that evolution had
taken place in the law since the time when a landowner
could set a spring-gun trap for trespassers. No one would
disagree or contend that such evolution was not beneficial to society. However, we respectfully submit that
an analogy between a spring gun and the hole in this
case is not justified in any degree. The former would
constitute an intentional injury and make the status of
a trespasser an outlaw. Under our system of law, the
possessor of 1and has had a legally protected interest in
the exclusiveness of his possession. Persons who intrude
without his permission have had no right to demand that
he provide them with a safe place to trespass or that he
protect them in the wronful use of his property. It seems
only just that an adult persons who knows that he is on
a place on the premises where he has no right or invitation to be (the jury by its verdict impliedly found that the
plaintiff had seen the sign "No Admittance - Employees Only") assumed the risk of injury to himself from a
condition lawfully maintained on the premises.
9
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c·oN·CLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the majority decisions
heretofore rendered by this court should be disaffirmed
and the verdict of the jury permitted to stand.
Respectfully submitted,
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